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DEFUSING THE BUG BOMB: 
LEGAL STRATEGIES TO COMBAT 
ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANT 
INFECTIONS 
 
ANDREW GELTMAN* 
 
I.     INTRODUCTION 
 
Antibiotics are truly a miraculous class of drugs1 that have saved many 
lives.2 With the development of antibiotics, certain diseases that were once 
considered death sentences are now simple infections that are easy to cure 
and control.3 Although many other classes of drugs were developed in the 
20
th
 century to fight microbial infections, none have proven as successful as 
antibiotics.4 The success of antibiotics is, however, leading to over-
prescription and use of these drugs.5  
The overuse of antibiotics has created a potential public health 
menace—the growth of microbial infections resistant to them.6 Antibiotic 
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 1. In describing the drugs’ consequential importance, U.S. Surgeon General William H. 
Stewart once said, “[t]he time has come to close the book on infectious diseases.” William Sage & 
David Hyman, Combating Antimicrobial Resistance: Regulatory Strategies and Institutional 
Capacity, 84 TUL. L. REV. 781, 784 (2010). 
 2. See Cory Fox, Resisting Antibiotic Resistance: Legal Strategies To Maintain Man’s 
Dominion Over Microbes, 12 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 35, 37 (2011) (discussing how 
antibiotics have been some of the most important and successful drugs in the treatment of 
disease). 
 3. Sage & Hyman, supra note 1, at 783 (noting that the rise of antibiotics eliminated once 
common causes of death, such as pneumonia and puerperal fever). 
 4. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 2, at 37 (stating that penicillin is one of the most successful 
treatments ever developed by mankind).  
 5. Sage & Hyman, supra note 1 (stating that persistent misuse and overuse of antibiotics is 
creating antibiotic resistance). 
 6. Id.  
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resistance stems from many causes that include the use of antibiotics in 
animal feed,7 medical practitioners’ over-prescription, the general public’s 
misuse of the drugs, and the failure to develop new antibiotics.8 This has 
led to the development of so called “super bugs” that are often immune to 
first line antibiotic therapies, such as penicillin, and to more powerful, 
broad-spectrum treatments.9 
The Center for Disease Control (“CDC”) has recognized this threat to 
public health.10 In a recent interview, the director of the CDC, Thomas R. 
Frieden, stated that “without urgent action now, more patients will be thrust 
back to a time before we had effective drugs.”11 The CDC highlights the 
extent of the problem, approximating that, as a “very conservative 
estimate,” nearly two million Americans are infected each year with 
antibiotic resistant infections12 and that 23 thousand Americans die as a 
result of such infections.13 The World Health Organization (“WHO”) 
estimates that antibiotic resistant infections cost the U.S. health system 
between 20–35 million dollars.14 Steve Solomon, the director of 
antimicrobial resistance for the CDC, stated: “[w]e need to act now. We do 
not have antibiotics in the pipeline that are going to be available soon 
enough to address those problems.”15  
 
 7. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANT THREATS IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (2013); see also Recommendations 
for Drug Sponsors for Voluntarily Aligning Product Use Conditions with GFI 209, 77 Fed. Reg. 
22,327 (2012) (stating the FDA’s concern in the use of antibiotics in animal feed, and providing 
guidance on the use of antibiotics in it). 
 8. See Growing Antibiotic Resistance, WASH. POST (Sept. 16, 2013, 8:12 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/growing-antibiotic-
resistance/2013/09/16/b61ac100-1f2d-11e3-8459-657e0c72fec8_graphic.html (noting that the lack 
of development of new antibiotics and their over-prescription by doctors).  
 9. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 5 (discussing how 
antibiotic resistant infections are common, and that many first and second line antibiotics are on 
the verge of becoming ineffective treatments against them). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Brady Dennis & Brian Vastag, Drug-Resistant Bacteria Pose Potential Catastrophe, CDC 
Warns, WASH. POST (Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-
science/drug-resistant-bacteria-pose-potential-catastrophe-cdc-warns/2013/09/16/4cd2d482-1ed6-
11e3-b7d1-7153ad47b549_story.html. 
 12. Id.   
 13. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 6. 
 14. Press Release, Exec. Office of the President, Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy, PCAST 
Releases New Report on Combating Antibiotic Resistance (Sept. 18, 2014, 2:00 PM) (on file with 
author), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/09/18/pcast-releases-new-report-
combating-antibiotic-resistance. 
 15. Dennis & Vastag, supra note 11. 
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The costs of antibiotic resistant infections to human life and the 
economy are high, but are potentially avoidable with prompt action.16 If we 
are going to “defuse the bug bomb” and address the problem of antibiotic 
resistant infections, we need to take action to limit the use of current drugs 
and to develop new antibiotics.17 Congress has not adequately addressed 
this problem; while several bills have been introduced in Congress to 
address antibiotic resistant infections,18 these bills failed to address the real 
cause of superbugs. Instead, these bills focused on the use of antibiotics in 
livestock, and in any event, failed to become laws.19 Although the use of 
antibiotics in the agricultural industry is problematic, the CDC does not 
consider antibiotic use in livestock as the primary source of antibiotic 
resistant infections that threaten humans.20 Rather, the CDC considers the 
primary source of antibiotic resistant infections in humans to come from our 
overuse of antibiotics and the failure to develop new antibiotics.21 In the 
words of the director of the CDC, “[t]he most resistant organisms in 
hospitals are emerging in those settings because of poor anti-microbial 
stewardship among humans.”22 Thus, this Article focuses on legal strategies 
both to control the use of antibiotics, and to develop antibiotic drug 
therapies to halt the spread of antibiotic resistant infections from person to 
person.  
 
II.     LEGAL STRATEGIES TO COMBAT ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE 
 
Since congressional action has failed to address the impending public 
health crisis23 that the CDC has identified,24 the executive branch should 
 
 16. See id. (stating that concerted and prompt effort is needed by the nation to combat 
antibiotic resistance). 
 17. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 12 (discussing the need 
for aggressive action to combat antibiotic resistance). 
 18. See, e.g., Strategies to Address Antimicrobial Resistance Act, H.R. 3697, 110th Cong. 
(2007) (seeking to fund data collection and awareness programs to fight the spread of antibiotic 
resistant infections) [hereinafter Proposed Bill]; see also Preservation of Antibiotics for Medical 
Treatment Act, H.R. 2400, 111th Cong. (2009) (seeking to take drastic actions to combat 
antibiotic resistant infections by banning the use of antibiotics in livestock feed, and creating 
tough approval standards for the use of new antibiotics on animals) [hereinafter Proposed Bill]. 
 19. See Proposed Bills, supra note 18; cf. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
supra note 7 (stating that human overuse in the medical context is the major cause of the 
development of antibiotic resistance). 
 20. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7; see also Dennis & Vastag, 
supra note 11 (stating that the major factor leading to antibiotic resistance is the overuse of the 
drug). 
 21. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 11–12. 
 22. Dennis & Vastag, supra note 11. 
 23. See Proposed Bills, supra note 18 and accompanying text.  
 24. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7. 
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work within the existing legal framework to address super bugs. Within the 
existing legal framework, it is possible for the executive branch to take 
various actions that promote better stewardship of antibiotics through direct 
government regulation and the development of new classes of antibiotic 
drug therapies.25  
Through various statutes, the executive branch has the capacity to 
expediently address the issues of overuse of antibiotics and the failure to 
develop new drugs.26 For example, the federal government could 
incorporate antibiotics into the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 
(“CSA”).27 While it is possible and desirable to control antibiotics 
domestically through the normal scheduling process in the CSA,28 there is a 
potentially faster route. Another possible avenue to address this problem is 
to incorporate the control of antibiotics into an executive agreement.29 
Since the problem of antibiotic resistance is an international problem, this 
kind of agreement might be a more effective way to control the supply of 
current drugs on the market than through purely domestic control.30  
In addition to controlling the overuse of antibiotics, the government 
can take steps to promote the development of new antibiotics. The federal 
government can use various governmental programs that are intended to 
promote the development and stockpile of prophylactics to also counter 
potential public health emergencies in encouraging the development of 
antibiotics.31 For example, the federal government could use Project 
BioShield (a program originally intended to subsidize the development of 
new drugs to counter chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological threats) 
to subsidize the development of new antibiotics.32 Further, the federal 
 
 25. See Combating Antibiotic Resistance, Executive Order 13676, 79 Fed. Reg. 56,931 (Sept. 
23, 2014) (ordering various executive agencies to use all of the authority at their disposal to 
combat antibiotic resistance). 
 26. See id. (ordering executive agencies to use all available legal means at their disposal to 
combat antibiotic resistance). 
 27. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2012).  
 28. See 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2012) (stating the authorities of various executive agencies and the 
scheduling process under the CSA). 
 29. See Dames and Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981) (holding that when Congress 
fails to act in an important foreign policy matter, the President has the authority to act). 
 30. See Editorial Board, Antibiotic Resistance is a Huge Threat to Human Health, WASH. 
POST (May 5, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/antibiotic-resistance-is-a-huge-
threat-to-human-health/2014/05/05/96b0279e-d23b-11e3-937f-d3026234b51c_story.html 
(discussing the global reach of antibiotic resistance and how it is a large threat to the world’s 
public health); see also Combating Antibiotic Resistance, Executive Order 13676, 79 Fed. Reg. 
56,931 (Sept. 23, 2014). 
 31. Project BioShield Act of 2004, 42 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).  
 32. Press Release, George Bush, President of the United States, Remarks at the Rose Garden 
at the Signing of S.15-Project BioShield Act of 2004 (July 21, 2004, 9:43 AM) (on file with 
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government could spur demand for new antibiotics by committing to 
purchase the newly developed drugs for the Strategic National Stockpile 
(“SNS”), a national stockpile of prophylactic countermeasures that would 
be released in the event of a public health crisis.33  Once the federal 
government has placed antibiotics in Project BioShield and a company has 
contracted to develop them, the government could prioritize the 
development of new antibiotics that can treat superbugs pursuant to the 
Defense Production Act of 1950, which allows the President to order 
companies to give priority to government contracts that are needed to 
promote the national defense.34 Lastly, the President could acquire the 
authority to prevent the spread of antibiotic resistant infections through the 
incorporation of superbugs into Executive Order 13295,35 which 
enumerates the President’s quarantine authority. Taken together, use of 
these various legal options will limit and control the use of existing 
antibiotics, inhibit the spread of superbugs, and create a more viable 
antibiotic marketplace that encourages the development of novel therapies. 
The purpose of this Article is to briefly review and discuss the legality and 
feasibility of each of these avenues of executive action.  
 
A.      Use of the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) to Limit the Overuse 
of Existing Antibiotics 
 
The CDC and WHO have stated that in order to control the spread of 
antibiotic resistant infections and maintain the effectiveness of antibiotics, it 
is important to limit their use.36 Under existing federal law, the CSA is a 
primary means of controlling the supply of drugs.37 The CSA allows the 
federal government to control the uses of certain drugs and even eliminate 
classes of drugs from the market.38 As a result, the CSA can serve as a 
principal means of controlling drug over-prescription by adding 
disincentives to prescribing drugs when it is not appropriate to do so (for 
 
author), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/07/20040721-2.html. 
 33. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6b (2012). 
 34. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071 (2012). 
 35. Revised List of Quarantinable Diseases, Executive Order 13674, 79 Fed. Reg. 45,671 
(Aug. 6, 2014). 
 36. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 11–12; see also Dennis & 
Vastag, supra note 11 (stating that the CDC would like to eliminate the unnecessary use of 
antibiotics in order to promote their continued effectiveness). 
 37. See 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2012) (granting the Attorney General authority to regulate and 
control substances that meet the requirements of the CSA). 
 38. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012); see also United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 
U.S. 483, 491 (2001) (noting how the CSA eliminates all uses of marijuana from the market 
except for uses within a government approved research project). 
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example, the CSA could attach various penalties to the over-prescription of 
antibiotics).39  
The CSA grants broad discretionary authority to the Attorney General 
(“AG”) and the Secretary of Health and Human Services (“Secretary”) to 
schedule drugs.40 Under the CSA, the Secretary and the AG divide the 
scheduling authority.41 The AG is responsible for promulgating rules 
relating only to the registration and control of the “efficient execution of his 
functions” under the statute.42 The Secretary is responsible for making 
medical judgments and scientific determinations so that the federal 
government can then schedule a drug.43 Under the CSA, the Secretary must 
make the necessary scientific and medical determinations before the AG 
can exercise his authority.44 The scheduling process takes between six to 
twelve months;45 scheduling can occur immediately, however, under the 
temporary authority of the AG.46 Further, the AG can delegate his 
temporary scheduling authority to the Secretary.47 As a result, the AG can 
immediately schedule antibiotics on a temporary basis, or the AG can 
delegate such authority to the Secretary.48 
The normal scheduling process requires the AG or the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (“DEA”)—the agency with the AG’s 
delegated authority—to consider seven factors before scheduling is 
authorized: (1) the actual or potential abuse of the drug; (2) the scientific 
evidence of its pharmacological effect; (3) the state of current scientific 
knowledge; (4) the history and current pattern of abuse of the drug; (5) the 
scope, duration, and significance of the abuse; (6) the risks to the public 
 
 39. BRIAN YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30722, DRUG OFFENSES: MAXIMUM FINES AND 
TERMS OF IMPRISONMENT FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT 
AND RELATED LAWS 3 (2012) (stating that the punishment for a first-time violation of the CSA 
for a schedule V drug ranges from a $100,000–250,000 fine to up to 1 year in prison). 
 40. 21 U.S.C. § 811(a) (2012); see also Touby v. U.S., 500 U.S. 160, 167 (1991) (holding that 
the broad discretionary authority granted to the AG through the CSA is not a violation of the non-
delegation doctrine). 
 41. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 265 (2006). 
 42. Id. at 259. 
 43. Id. at 265. 
 44. Touby, 500 U.S. at 162 (“A substance cannot be scheduled if the Secretary recommends 
against it.”). 
 45. Id. at 163 (“From the time when law enforcement identify a dangerous new drug, it 
typically takes 6 to 12 months to add it to one of the schedules.”). 
 46. Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 811(h) (2012)) (“Congress in 1984 amended the Act to create an 
expedited procedure by which the Attorney General can schedule a substance on a temporary 
basis when doing so is ‘necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to public safety.’”). 
 47. Id. at 169 (discussing how the court has interpreted 21 U.S.C. § 501(a) to permit the 
delegation of any function vested in the AG unless a specific limit on that delegation appears 
elsewhere in the statute).  
 48. Id. 
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health; and (7) the psychic or physiological dependence liability.49 The 
CSA mandates that the Secretary make any scientific findings before the 
AG can exercise his authority to schedule a drug.50 Since the CDC is part of 
Health and Human Services (“HHS”), and therefore under the Secretary’s 
authority, the CDC has already reached numerous findings on the effects 
and dangers of the misuse of antibiotics.51 Therefore, the key to scheduling 
antibiotics under the CSA is for the Secretary to use this prior work to 
establish scientific findings that such misuse constitutes a threat to public 
health, and that control of the drug is justified.52  
 
1.     Antibiotics meet the statutory requirements for scheduling 
 
Antibiotics should qualify under most of the CSA’s various scheduling 
requirements. The CDC reports that antibiotics are the most commonly 
prescribed drugs and that up to 50% of all antibiotics prescribed are 
unnecessary.53 Vicky Fraser, a member of the Infectious Diseases Society 
of America’s antimicrobial resistance committee, states that, “[o]ften when 
people are sick with viral infections, they want an antibiotic. . . . There is a 
misperception that antibiotics help everything, even viral infections.”54  
These misperceptions have led to the actual abuse of the drug,55 and will 
lead to continued misuse without further controls.56 There is little doubt that 
the misuse of antibiotics has substantially led to the rise of antibiotic 
resistant infections,57 and that this constitutes an actual abuse of the drug 
with widespread misuse.58 The current pattern of abuse occurs because of a 
multitude of factors, one of which is that “[o]ften people use antibiotics 
because they’re worried” and “[t]here’s pressure . . . to feel like they are 
doing something.”59  
 
 49. 21 U.S.C. § 811(c)(1)–(7). 
 50. Touby, 500 U.S. at 162. 
 51. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7 (discussing the medical and 
economic harms that antibiotic resistant infections cause).  
 52. See 21 U.S.C. § 811(c)(6) (2012) (noting that the danger of the drug to the public health is  
a factor that should be taken into account when making scheduling decisions). 
 53. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7. 
 54. Dennis & Vastag, supra note 11. 
 55. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7. 
 56. Id. at 12 (“Bacteria will inevitably find ways of resisting the antibiotics we develop, 
which is why aggressive action is needed now to keep new resistance from developing and to 
prevent the resistance that already exists from spreading.”). 
 57. Id. at 11. 
 58. See 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2012) (noting that a drug with widespread misuse is an important 
factor when scheduling a drug). 
 59. Dennis & Vastag, supra note 11. 
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The widespread misuse of these drugs constitutes a public health threat 
because it leads to the development of superbugs.60 More and more 
pathogens are becoming resistant to antibiotics and are becoming 
increasingly deadly.61 A prime example of such a pathogen is Carbapenem-
resistant Enterobacteriaceae (“CRE”).62 According to the CDC, CRE has 
become resistant to almost all of the antibiotics currently available.63 The 
disease results in roughly 600 deaths per year, and half of all bloodstream 
infections caused by CRE result in death.64 Many in the medical profession 
refer to CRE as the “nightmare bacteria.”65 Cases of CRE were documented 
throughout the country in hospitals, and even resulted in the deaths of seven 
people under the care of the prestigious National Institutes of Health 
(“NIH”).66 The rise of resistant infections is connected to both the use of 
antibiotics when they are not needed, and when doctors prescribe antibiotics 
to meet the emotional demands of patients.67 The abuse of antibiotics for 
psychic reasons is, in part, responsible for deaths from CRE and other 
antibiotic resistant infections.68 The aggregation of individual abuses of 
antibiotics leads to the rise of resistant infections and pose a great threat to 
public health.69 Antibiotics thereby satisfy the “public health” prong for 
scheduling.70  
There is only one statutory requirement that poses a potential problem 
for scheduling antibiotics: the drug’s psychic or physiological dependence 
liability.71 There is little, if any, risk for the development of physiological 
dependence on antibiotics;72 there is some risk, however, for an emotional 
 
 60. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 28 (noting that the misuse 
of antibiotics overtime has lead to an increasing number of antibiotic resistant infections). 
 61. See id. at 15–17 (listing the various drug resistant infections). 
 62. Id. at 53–54. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Dennis & Vastag, supra note 11. 
 66. Id.   
 67. See id. (discussing the over-prescription of antibiotics and connecting their over-
prescription to meeting the psychic demands of patients); see also CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 28 (noting that shortly after the development of penicillin, antibiotic 
resistance began to occur). 
 68. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 14 (demonstrating the 
process by which antibiotic resistance develops). 
 69. Id. at 41 (discussing how whenever antibiotics are used, it can lead to the development of 
antibiotic resistance and how this is especially problematic when antibiotic are misused are 
improperly used). 
 70. See 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2012) (providing that public health is a factor in the determination 
of whether a drug should be scheduled under the Act). 
 71. § 811(c)(7). 
 72. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 25 (discussing how 
antibiotics are generally safe drugs to use); see also Using Antibiotics Wisely, WEBMD, 
http://www.webmd.com/a-to-z-guides/using-antibiotics-wisely-topic-overview (last updated Mar. 
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dependence on the drug.73 As previously noted, a large amount of the 
overuse of antibiotics comes from patients’ misuse.74  
There is some evidence that the misuse of antibiotics is in part due to 
many individuals’ need to feel like they are doing something to treat 
themselves.75 Patients often seek these drugs—even when they have a viral 
infection, which is an infection that antibiotics will not treat.76 Thus, since 
there is evidence that individuals use antibiotics for improper emotional 
purposes, antibiotics should qualify for scheduling under the CSA.77 
Further, the use of antibiotics for psychic purposes can lead to actual 
physical harm.78 Antibiotics are responsible for one out of every five 
emergency room visits for adverse drug effects.79 Among the most 
prevalent adverse reactions are those caused by allergic reactions as well as 
the development of Clostridium difficile (“C. difficile”).80 C. difficile is a 
bacteria that can lead to a deadly diarrhea, which can develop from 
needlessly taking antibiotics.81 The amount of hospitalizations for adverse 
reactions to the misuse of antibiotics for psychic purposes alone warrants 
scheduling in its own right.82 The harms that directly result from misuse,83 
however, coupled with the indirect harms that flow from the development 
of resistant infections84 create a strong argument for the AG and the 
Secretary to schedule antibiotics. 
 
 
 
 
10, 2013) (noting the list of side effects from antibiotics and how physical dependency is not one 
of them). 
 73. See Dennis & Vastag, supra note 11 (discussing how people take antibiotics out of a sense 
of worry that is developed from various social pressures).  
 74. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7. 
 75. See, e.g., The Spread of Superbugs, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 31, 2011), 
http://www.economist.com/node/18483671 (discussing how antibiotics are misused by 
hypochondriacs).  
 76. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 34 (noting the 
demands of patients for antibiotics for the purpose of treating viral infections).  
 77. See 21 U.S.C. § 811(c)(7) (2012) (listing the factors that should be taken into when 
making a scheduling determination).  
 78. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 25 (stating the physical 
harms that can result from the misuse of antibiotics). 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id.  
 82. See id. at 26 (noting the 14,000 annual deaths as a result of C. difficile); cf. 21 U.S.C. § 
811(c)(6) (2012) (stating that the threat to public health is an important factor in making 
scheduling decisions).  
 83. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 25. 
 84. Id. at 11. 
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2.     Antibiotics should be controlled as a schedule V drug 
 
The CSA establishes a five-tiered “scheduling” program where drugs 
are placed into schedules ranked between I–V.85 Schedule I is the most 
restrictive, while schedule V is the least restrictive.86 Drugs in schedule I 
carry heavy criminal penalties and the drugs are banned for any purpose 
other than a government funded research project.87 Drugs scheduled in 
classes II through V have “legitimate medical purposes,” and any registered 
doctor can prescribe these drugs.88 Drugs prescribed under schedules II 
through V must be used “for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual 
practitioner acting in the usual course of his professional practice.”89 In 
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers Co-op, the Court found that 
Congress determined that there was no legitimate medical purpose for 
schedule I drugs, and that the only legitimate usage of them was for 
government approved research.90 Antibiotics should not be classified as a 
schedule I drug because they have significant medical benefits.91   
The best category fit for antibiotics is schedule V. In order to classify a 
drug under schedule V, the following must apply: (1) the drug must have a 
low potential for abuse relative to the drugs in schedule IV; (2) the drug 
must have a currently accepted medical use in the U.S.; and (3) abuse of the 
drug may lead to limited physiological or psychic dependence.92 Antibiotics 
satisfy these statutory requirements, and can be classified as a schedule V 
drug. First, antibiotics have a low potential for abuse compared to every 
other schedule.93 Second, antibiotics have a clearly accepted medical use in 
the U.S.—to treat bacterial infections.94  Third, antibiotics are sometimes 
 
 85. 21 U.S.C. § 812(a) (2012). 
 86. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012); see also BRIAN YEH, supra note 39. 
 87. § 812; see also United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 490 
(2001) (holding that all drugs classified as schedule I are not subject to a common law medical 
necessity defense). 
 88. § 812(b)(2)–(5)(B). 
 89. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2005).  
 90. 532 U.S. 483, 491 (2001) (“In the case of the Controlled Substances Act, the statute 
reflects a determination [by Congress] that marijuana has no medical benefits worthy of an 
exception (outside the confines of a Government-approved research project).”). 
 91. See NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, Antibiotics, MEDLINEPLUS, 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/antibiotics.html (last updated Dec. 23, 2014) (discussing the 
various medical benefits of antibiotics). 
 92. § 812(b)(5). 
 93. See § 812 (noting that the drugs that are already contained within schedule IV and 
antibiotics have a smaller psychic or physical dependence liability then schedule IV drugs); see 
also Sage & Hyman, supra note 1, at 816 (discussing the use of the CSA to schedule any newly 
developed antibiotics in order to defend their efficacy). 
 94. NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, supra note 91. 
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prescribed for psychic reasons.95 Antibiotics are the most-prescribed drugs 
in the world and are often incorrectly prescribed.96 Therefore, there is an 
increased potential for abuse because of the ubiquity and ease of the 
availability of antibiotics.97 For these reasons, antibiotics should be 
controlled as a schedule V drug under the CSA.  
The scheduling of antibiotics would also put physicians on notice that 
they need to better control their prescription of antibiotics.98 In United 
States v. Moore,99 the U.S. Supreme Court held that being a registered 
doctor does not give doctors blanket authorization to distribute or dispense 
controlled substances.100 The Court ruled that since the CSA mandates that 
doctors must comply with the plain language of the statute and its 
implementing regulations, doctors must abide by the restrictions of the CSA 
or they will face fines and other possible penalties.101 
The benefit of scheduling antibiotics as a class V drug is that it will 
result in the least amount of restrictions while also providing patients with a 
vital life saving drug.102 Additionally, scheduling limits doctors’ 
prescription of the drug to medical necessity while also punishing negligent 
behavior.103 If antibiotics are so scheduled, then doctors will not be subject 
to penalties when they are properly administering antibiotics.104 To avoid 
penalties and other risks, doctors would only need to do what they are 
 
 95. See Dennis & Vastag, supra note 11 (discussing how people want antibiotics in order to 
feel like they are being treated). 
 96. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7. 
 97. See Howard Markel, No Prescription for Antibiotics? No Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 
2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/12/health/no-prescription-for-antibiotics-no-
problem.html (discussing how easy it is to get antibiotics in the U.S. without a prescription). 
 98. See 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2012) (stating that many controlled substances have a legitimate 
medical purpose, but that they also pose a detrimental effect to the welfare of the American 
people, and that it is important for the federal government to regulate access to them); see also 
Sage & Hyman, supra note 1, at 816 (discussing how the CSA could be used to control the supply 
of antibiotics). 
 99. 423 U.S. 122 (1975).  
 100. Id. at 124 (holding that doctors can be prosecuted for violations of the CSA when their 
conduct falls outside the course of professional practice). 
 101. Id. at 131 (ruling that the CSA only exempts lawful acts from prosecution, and that 
doctors are not exempt from the requirements of the statute).  
 102. See 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012) (stating that schedule V drugs have a “currently accepted 
medical use in the United States”); see also BRIAN YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34635, THE 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT: REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS (2012). 
 103. BRIAN YEH, supra note 39 (noting that the punishment for violating the CSA for a 
schedule V drug ranges from a fine from $100,000–250,000 or up to 1 year in prison for the first 
violation); see also Moore, 423 U.S. at 133 (stating that only the lawful acts of registrants are 
exempted from prosecution, which include prescribing antibiotics for legitimate medical 
purposes).  
 104. Moore, 423 U.S. at 140 (holding that the statute was designed to limit the dispensing 
authority of controlled substances to activities within the doctor’s professional practice). 
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already supposed to do: prescribe antibiotics when it is medically necessary 
to do so.105  
 
3.   The decision to schedule antibiotics should be upheld by the courts 
 
The CSA grants broad discretionary authority to the executive branch 
in determining whether or not a drug should be scheduled.106 This 
authority, however, is not granted to one single department of the executive 
branch.107 In order to schedule a drug, the Secretary must first make a 
scientific determination on its dangers.108 If the Secretary makes a scientific 
determination on the health effects of the misuse of antibiotics, the CSA 
then authorizes the AG to schedule the drug.109 The courts have generally 
given broad deference to the executive branch in the exercise of delegated 
discretionary authority.110 The broad deference afforded to the executive 
branch should mean that the court would use the findings of the Secretary 
and the AG to determine that the scheduling is not “arbitrary and 
capricious.”111 In addition, the AG’s decision to schedule antibiotics is not 
likely to be considered an unlawful attempt to define the practice of 
medicine.112 As a result, the courts will likely uphold the scientific findings 
of the secretary and the scheduling decision of the AG. 
Under Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council,113  the Court will likely 
grant the executive branch broad deference in its scientific findings and 
subsequent decision to schedule antibiotics.114 In Chevron, the Court stated 
that the judiciary affords substantial deference to an administrative 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute.115 The primary issue then becomes 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. See 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2012) (stating the scheduling authority of various executive branch 
departments). 
 107. Id. (noting how the scheduling process is split between the AG and the Secretary, who are 
the heads of two different departments within the executive branch). 
 108. Id. § 811(b). 
 109. Id. 
 110. See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1987) (stating that an 
administrative agency is generally given broad deference to interpret the statutory regimes they 
are entrusted to implement).  
 111. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (stating the conditions by which agency action can be 
reviewed); see also 21 U.S.C. § 877 (2012) (stating that findings of fact by the AG are 
conclusive). 
 112. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 27 (2005) (upholding the validity of the CSA and 
stating that it is a valid regulatory regime that controls the use of substances with medical uses). 
 113. 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1987). 
 114. Id; see also Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 27 (articulating the broad regulatory powers of the 
CSA). 
 115. 467 U.S. at 844. 
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whether the Secretary’s scientific findings, when properly viewed through 
the broad deference doctrine afforded to executive decisions under 
Chevron, would be arbitrary and capricious.116 The CSA requires that the 
Secretary make the findings based upon substantial evidence.117 Under the 
CSA’s standard, a court must consider whether “a reasonable mind might 
accept a particular evidentiary record as adequate to support a 
conclusion.”118 The executive is not required to have absolute medical 
certainty in making its determinations, but rather only a legitimate basis to 
take action based on the current state of medical evidence.119 The medical 
community, including the WHO and the CDC, has developed substantial 
evidence of the negative effects of the overuse of antibiotics.120 In addition, 
there is well-established evidence of the dramatic adverse public health 
effects as a result of the spread of antibiotic resistance.121 The CSA does 
not require absolute medical certainty in order for the Secretary to make a 
medical finding.122 As a result, the existing evidence on psychic 
dependence, even though not conclusive, could still permit scheduling when 
it is properly viewed as a public health statute.123  Therefore, overwhelming 
evidence of the dangerous overuse and misuse of antibiotics by the public 
overshadows the relative uncertainty as to the potential liability for 
dependence on antibiotics.124 Thus, when viewed in its totality, the courts 
will likely afford the medical record Chevron deference, and will likely 
deem scheduling of antibiotics lawful.125  
The CSA grants discretionary authority to the AG to decide which 
substances should be registered and controlled; the Secretary, however, 
 
 116. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (setting forth the arbitrary and capricious standard for agency 
action); 21 U.S.C. § 877 (2012).  
 117. See Am. for Safe Access v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 706 F.3d 438, 450 (D.C. Cir. 
2013) (stating that the CSA directs courts to review the agency’s findings of substantial findings). 
 118. Id. (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162 (1999)).  
 119. See 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2012) (stating that scheduling decisions must be made based on the 
current state of scientific understanding); see also Am. for Safe Access, 706 F.3d at 450 (applying 
a reasonable person standard to the adequacy of data used to make scientific findings).  
 120. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7 (discussing the various 
negative effects from the overuse of antibiotics). 
 121. Id. 
 122. See Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 930 F.2d 936, 939 
(1991) (stating that absolute medical certainty is not needed to meet the statutory requirements for 
scheduling). 
 123. 21 U.S.C. § 811(c)(6) (2012) (requiring the Secretary to determine what, if any, risk exists 
to the public health). 
 124. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7 (noting the volume of 
evidence demonstrating that the overuse of antibiotics causes a threat to the public health). 
 125. See, e.g., Am. for Safe Access v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 706 F.3d 438, 452 (D.C. Cir. 
2013) (holding that the scientific determination that marijuana has no valid medical use, in spite of 
evidence to the contrary, was not an invalid finding by the agency). 
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cannot trigger this authority without appropriate medical findings.126 In 
order for the AG to schedule a drug as arbitrary and capricious, the AG 
must do so without scientific findings from the Secretary, and the AG’s 
actions must constitute an attempt to define the practice of medicine.127 In 
Gonzales v. Oregon,128 the Court ruled that the AG acted beyond his 
statutory authority when he used his rulemaking authority under the CSA 
because the AG’s regulation sought to define the practice of medicine and 
was made without a scientific finding from the Secretary.129 In United 
States v. Moore,130 the Court granted the AG broad authority to criminalize 
improper drug dispensing practices that lead to the harm of patients.131  The 
Court, however, limited the authority of the AG to scheduling drugs when 
such action defines what constitutes the practice of medicine.132  Based on 
this rationale, the Court in Oregon found that the AG does not have the 
authority to promulgate regulations under the CSA that would criminalize 
the prescription of drugs to assist patient suicide.133 The AG determined 
that the physician’s purpose of dispensing of drugs for assisted suicides was 
not within the legitimate medical practice, and that this practice was 
unlawful under the CSA.134 The Court stated that Congress delegated 
limited authority to the AG for creating regulations pursuant to the control 
of drugs. Under the CSA, “control” means “to add a drug or substance to a 
schedule.”135 The AG does not, however, have the authority to define 
which acts are within the practice of medicine.136 Rather, the states have the 
authority to determine what constitutes the practice of medicine.137 If the 
state deems an action as within the practice of medicine, the AG cannot 
then make a regulation that criminalizes the action under the CSA.138  
The scheduling of antibiotics under the CSA does not constitute an 
impermissible attempt to define the practice of medicine as articulated in 
 
 126. 21 U.S.C. § 811(b) (2012); see Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 265 (2006).   
 127. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 264–65. 
 128. 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
 129. Id. at 264–65. 
 130. 423 U.S. 122 (1975).  
 131. Id. at 124.  
 132. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 261–62.  
 133. Id. at 261. 
 134. Id. at 254. 
 135. 21 U.S.C § 802(5) (2009).  
 136. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 272. 
 137. Id. at 270 (interpreting the CSA as relying upon state based definitions for the practice of 
medicine). 
 138. Id. at 262 (highlighting the efforts of Congress to refuse granting authority to the AG to 
define what constitutes the practice of medicine).   
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the Oregon decision.139 First, in Oregon, the Court was faced with a 
situation where the state had affirmatively determined that physician-
assisted suicide was within legitimate practice of medicine via a statute.140 
Currently, there is no affirmative statute allowing for the use of antibiotics 
for any reason other than treating bacterial infections.141 The scheduling of 
antibiotics only seeks to control the use of antibiotics in situations when it is 
not medically appropriate to do so.142  Second, unlike Oregon, the AG 
would be scheduling antibiotics only once the Secretary has made proper 
scientific findings.143 Third, unlike Oregon, when scheduling antibiotics, 
the AG would not be seeking to define a specific act that is not within the 
legitimate exercise of the practice of medicine, but rather would seek to 
schedule a whole class of drugs in order to promote the public health.144 By 
scheduling antibiotics under the CSA, the AG is only attempting to bar 
doctors from prescribing drugs when it is not medically required.145 Such a 
requirement does not conflict with state law or a state’s determination of 
what constitutes the practice of medicine.146 In fact, scheduling serves to 
complement the state’s definition of the practice of medicine by attaching 
penalties to actions that doctors should not be taking.147 Thereby, the 
scheduling of antibiotics merely adds additional disincentives to actions that 
doctors should already not be taking.148   
 
 139. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 27 (2005) (noting the ability of the government to 
control the use of substances with legitimate medical uses under the CSA without constituting an 
impermissible attempt to define the practice of medicine). 
 140. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (1999); see also Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 252. 
 141. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3303 (2010) (stating that prescription drugs, including 
antibiotics, can only be issued for legitimate therapeutic reasons). 
 142. United States v. Moore, 443 U.S. 122, 131–32 (1975) (holding that lawful acts of doctors 
who are registered under the act are exempt from criminal liability).  
 143. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 253–54 (noting that the AG’s regulation of the use of drugs to assist 
patients in suicide was unlawful under the CSA because the AG failed to acquire a scientific 
finding from the Secretary). 
 144. See Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 27; see also 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1973) (discussing the purpose of 
the CSA). 
 145. Moore, 423 U.S. at 140–41 (1975) (stating that doctors can dispense drugs when it falls 
within his professional practice); see also United States v. Kanner, 603 F.3d 530, 535 (8th Cir. 
2010) (upholding the ruling of Moore after the Oregon decision, ruling that distributing drugs 
outside the course of professional practice constitutes a criminal violation of the CSA). 
 146. Moore, 423 U.S. at 141; see also Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 24 (noting that the scheduling of 
drugs is not an attempt to define the practice of medicine, but rather a regulatory action to control 
the misuse of drugs with legitimate medical uses to protect the general welfare of the American 
people).  
 147. Moore, at 144 (“[The] implication is that physicians who go beyond approved practice 
remain subject to serious criminal penalties.”).  
 148. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3303 (2010) (noting that under Virginia state law, the 
prescription of any drug without medical necessity is a criminal violation). 
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The plain language of the CSA and the Oregon decision itself grants 
broad authority to the Secretary to schedule drugs as long as the Secretary 
makes the necessary medical findings, and that the class of drugs can satisfy 
all of the statutory requirements for scheduling.149 The Oregon decision 
does not bar the AG and the Secretary from exercising their broad 
discretionary authority to choose which drugs to schedule.150 Oregon only 
bars the AG from defining what constitutes the practice of medicine when 
the states have already done so.151 As a result, the scheduling of antibiotics, 
if done according to the normal scheduling process, would likely be upheld 
as a valid exercise of statutory authority of the Secretary and the AG.  
 
B.     The Use of Executive Agreements to Control the Improper Use of 
Antibiotics 
 
Antibiotics satisfy all of the statutory requirements for scheduling 
under the CSA; it may be more effective, however, to control antibiotics 
through international agreements.152 This makes sense because the problem 
of antibiotic resistant infections is not uniquely an American problem.153 In 
recent reports, the CDC and WHO have stated that antibiotic resistance is a 
problem that does not recognize political boundaries and will likely require 
international cooperation to effectively combat.154 An international 
agreement on the use of antibiotics could potentially provide more effective 
control of the spread of antibiotic resistant infections than scheduling would 
under purely domestic authority.155 Coordinating U.S. efforts with other 
countries would likely reduce antibiotic resistant infections from entering 
American borders, and would reduce global misuse of antibiotics.156 
Moreover, the use of an international agreement to control antibiotics for 
the purposes of fighting antibiotic resistance and preventing a public health 
 
 149. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 260 (2006). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 270 (stating that the CSA “piggybacks” off of state law and relies on it to define 
what falls within the legitimate practice of medicine).  
 152. See Nat’l Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Drug Enforcement Agency, 559 F.2d 
735, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (discussing the how the AG may schedule a drug in order to meet an 
international obligation without regard to the normal scheduling process). 
 153. See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 27 (noting the lack of 
international surveillance systems); see also Dennis & Vastag, supra note 11. 
 154. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7; see also Dennis & Vastag, 
supra note 11 (discussing the international nature of antibiotic resistance and the particular 
importance of combating resistant infections); see also Combating Antibiotic Resistance, 
Executive Order 13676, 79 Fed. Reg. 56,931 (Sept. 23, 2014). 
 155. See supra note 152.  
 156. See supra note 152.  
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crisis can occur without any further congressional action.157 Although the 
Constitution requires the President to ratify treaties with the advice and 
consent of two-thirds of the Senate,158 an executive agreement (an 
agreement between the executive branch of the United States and the 
executive of a foreign country without the approval of the Senate)159 can 
occur without such approval.160 As a result, the agreement becomes a de 
facto treaty.161 In Dames and Moores v. Regan, the Court stated that when 
Congress acquiesces its responsibility to resolve important matters of 
foreign policy, the President can take action to resolve such matters.162 So 
far, Congress has acquiesced in regards to the issue of antibiotic resistant 
infections by failing to pass legislation163 even in the face of warnings of 
the impending public health crisis from both domestic and international 
health authorities.164 In these circumstances, the President could enter into 
an executive agreement with other countries to take measures to halt the 
spread of antibiotic resistant infections. 
 
C.     Project BioShield Could Provide a Basis to Spur New Antibiotic 
Development 
 
The CSA provides for an effective means of controlling the use of 
existing antibiotics. Antibiotic stewardship alone, however, is not sufficient 
to halt the spread of antibiotic resistant infections; we must also develop 
new antibiotics.165  The Project BioShield Act of 2004166 (“Project 
BioShield”) was enacted in order to spur the development of 
 
 157. See Dames & Moores v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981) (discussing the President’s 
authority to act in the international realm in the absence of congressional authorization). 
 158. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 159. Treaty vs. Executive Agreement, Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70133.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2014) (stating that the 
difference between an executive agreement and a treaty is that a treaty is done with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, while an executive agreement is an international agreement entered into 
solely through the constitutional authority of the President).  
 160. United States v. Pink, 315 US 203, 229–30 (1942). 
 161. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 11 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 723.2-2(C) AGREEMENTS 
PURSUANT TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT (2006) (discussing when an 
international agreement can be entered into based solely on the President’s constitutional powers 
without the advice and consent of the Senate). 
 162. 453 U.S. at 688. 
 163. Proposed Bills, supra note 18 and accompanying text.  
 164. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., Ctr. For Disease Control & 
Prevention (May 1, 2014) (on file with author), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2014/s0430-who-antibiotic-resistance.html. 
 165. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 44 (noting that bacterial 
infections will inevitably evolve and as a result, new antibiotics will need to be developed). 
 166. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6a (2012).  
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countermeasures against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
(“CBRN”) threats.167 The law was passed in the wake of 9/11 and the 
anthrax attacks.168 These attacks created widespread fear in America, and 
highlighted the nation’s vulnerability to CBRN threats due to a lack of 
effective countermeasures.169 While Project BioShield was passed with the 
intent of preventing and mitigating the effects of terrorist attacks,170 the 
language of the statute does not limit the development of countermeasures 
for that purpose alone.171 Project BioShield authorizes the Secretary to 
grant research and development funds to “qualified countermeasures.”172 A 
“qualified countermeasure” is defined as any medical product that the 
Secretary deems necessary to treat any biological agent, including 
organisms that cause infectious disease that may cause a public health 
emergency affecting national security.173  
Project BioShield was developed because of the failures of the market 
system to produce countermeasures to CBRN threats.174 As with the failure 
to produce countermeasures to CBRN threats, the market has also failed to 
develop new antibiotics to combat resistant infections.175 The Secretary 
could use the broad discretionary authority granted to him under Project 
BioShield in order to deem novel antibiotics as “qualified 
countermeasure[s].”176 The Secretary has substantial evidence showing that 
the public’s vulnerability to various resistant diseases is so dangerous to the 
public health that it threatens the nation’s security.177 Placing antibiotics 
 
 167. Press Release, George Bush, President of the United States, Remarks at the Rose Garden 
at the Signing of S.15-Project BioShield Act of 2004 (July 21, 2004, 9:43 AM) (on file with 
author), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/07/20040721-2.html (discussing the reasons why 
Project BioShield was passed into law, and the policy goals of the legislation). 
 168. Id.  
 169. Id. 
 170. Id.  
 171. § 247d-6a(1) (noting that the Secretary’s authority extends to “qualified 
countermeasures,” which includes anything that may treat harm from a biological agent (including 
organisms that cause infectious diseases)). 
 172. § 247d-6a(a)(2)(A)(i). 
 173. Id.  
 174. FRANK GOTTRON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41033, PROJECT BIOSHIELD: 
AUTHORITIES, APPROPRIATIONS, ACQUISITIONS, AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (2011). 
 175. Fox, supra note 2, at 45–46 (stating that the lack of new antibiotics is largely because of 
market failures); see also INFECTIOUS DISEASE SOC’Y OF AM., BAD BUGS, NO DRUGS: AS 
ANTIBIOTICS DISCOVERY STAGNATES, A PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS BREWS 16 (2004) (stating that 
the success of antibiotics in treating disease serves as a disincentive to drug producers to develop 
new antibiotics). 
 176. § 247d-6a(a)(2)(A)(i). 
 177. Combating Antibiotic Resistance, Executive Order 13676, 79 Fed. Reg. 56,931 (Sept. 23, 
2014) (noting that the President has declared antibiotic resistance as a threat to national security 
and made this determination using evidence provided by the CDC). 
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under Project BioShield allows for the use of a five billion dollar fund to 
subsidize the development of new antibiotics, and in addition, Project 
BioShield provides a market guarantee for these products.178 The 
government guarantees a market for any developed drugs by agreeing that 
any developed drug will be incorporated into the SNS.179 The SNS is a 
stockpile of countermeasures that the government holds in reserve 
throughout the country in the event that there is a catastrophic public health 
emergency.180 It is necessary to develop new antibiotics in order to ensure 
the continued effectiveness of current drugs, as well as to widen treatment 
options against resistant infection strains.181 Therefore, HHS should use its 
broad authority to incorporate antibiotics into the Project BioShield 
program.182 The inclusion of antibiotics into Project BioShield would 
recognize the growing threat that antibiotic resistant infections pose to the 
nation while also providing an important market incentive to private 
companies to develop new drugs.  
Project BioShield grants the HHS Secretary (in concurrence with the 
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), and upon 
approval of the President) the authority to purchase a countermeasure up to 
eight years before the drug is developed and delivered.183 In order to 
provide an additional incentive beyond the market guarantee, HHS is 
authorized to deliver up to half of the payment for the drug before it is even 
successfully developed.184 The purpose of this provision is to subsidize the 
substantial amount of money needed in order to develop new drugs.185 
Many experts believe that it can cost up to one billion dollars to develop 
any given new prophylactic.186 Incorporating antibiotics into the pool of 
drugs that the government seeks to develop through Project BioShield will 
likely result in the development of more powerful antibiotics that can 
effectively combat resistant infections. Moreover, placing antibiotics into 
Project BioShield will help overcome the lack of financial incentives to 
create new drugs in the current market.187 The federal government can also 
 
 178. GOTTRON, supra note 174, at 5. 
 179. Id. at 2. 
 180. § 247d-6b(a). 
 181. Fox, supra note 2, at 61. 
 182. § 247d-6a (noting that the Secretary can use their authority to approve the development 
for any “qualified countermeasure”). 
 183. GOTTRON, supra note 174, at 2–3. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 1. 
 186. Matthew Herper, The Truly Staggering Cost of Inventing New Drugs, FORBES (Feb. 10, 
2012, 7:41 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2012/02/10/the-truly-staggering-
cost-of-inventing-new-drugs/ (stating that the cost to develop new drugs is around 1.3 billion 
dollars). 
 187. GOTTRON, supra note 174, at 3. 
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create a guaranteed market and provide advance funding in order to help 
subsidize high research and development costs, motivating drug companies 
to develop new drugs.188  
 
1.    Project BioShield allows the federal government to promote  
       stewardship of newly developed antibiotics 
 
If new antibiotics are developed under Project BioShield, the major 
consumer of the drugs will be the federal government.189 The government 
will have control over a major supply of the drug, and as a result, will be in 
a better position to promote stewardship over new antibiotics.190 Although 
the drug will still be available to the general public for use when it is 
medically necessary, the government’s control over the supply will make it 
more difficult for new drugs to be overused.191 The federal government’s 
withholding of a large supply of the drug on the open market will help 
maintain a higher price for the drug, causing it to only be used when 
medically necessary.192 The prospect of a higher market price will further 
incentivize drug companies to develop new antibiotics.193 The use of 
Project BioShield will not only lead to the development of new drugs, but 
will help control the supply of the drugs in a manner that promotes the long 
term effectiveness of antibiotics.194  
 
 
 
 
 188. Id. (noting that the incentives of Project BioShield substantially reduces the risks of 
private investment by providing a guaranteed market and funds).  
 189. See, e.g., Steve Sternberg, U.S. Government Stockpiles New, Safer Smallpox Vaccine, 
USA TODAY (May 25, 2010, 1:37 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/health/2010-05-25-
smallpox25_ST_N.htm (discussing how the U.S. has stockpiled over 300 million doses of 
smallpox vaccine as part of the SNS, and demonstrating how the market guarantee can be an 
effective incentive for the production of new countermeasures). 
 190. See Fox, supra note 2, at 61 (stating that in order to combat antibiotic resistant infections, 
there must be effective drug stewardship, and new drugs must be developed). 
 191. Id. (noting that the market guarantee will cause a substantial portion of any produced 
antibiotic to be under direct government supervision in the SNS, and thereby not available for 
public consumption on the open market). 
 192. Sage & Hyman, supra note 1, at 814 (discussing how government stockpiling will reduce 
the supply of available drugs to the general public). 
 193. See Alexandra Sifferlin, Why Reducing Antibiotic Resistance Is Harder Than It Seems, 
TIME (Sep. 19, 2014), http://time.com/3403542/combating-antibiotic-resistance/ (discussing the 
influence of price, and how federal incentives can be changed to increase prices of antibiotics and 
encourage development). 
 194. See 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6b (2012) (discussing the procurement process under Project 
BioShield as well as the stockpiling of drugs in the SNS, which controls the supply of newly 
developed drugs while also providing a market guarantee that encourages their development).  
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2.    Potential funding limitations of Project BioShield 
 
Like many federal government programs, Project BioShield is not 
without its flaws. The primary problem with Project BioShield is that 
Congress transferred many of the funds originally appropriated to the 
program to other parts of the government.195 As a result, Project 
BioShield’s funding stream to purchase drugs is not stable.196 The 
instability in funding creates a disincentive to private companies seeking 
funds to develop drugs pursuant to the program.197 The instability of 
funding is particularly problematic because the upfront costs of developing 
new drugs are extremely high.198 While lack of steady funding could inhibit 
the prospect of developing new antibiotics under the program, it is not 
conclusive.199 The market incentives currently in place (the SNS and 
prepayment programs in concert with normal market forces) create a 
powerful economic incentive for private corporations to actually develop 
new antibiotics that can overcome the flaws of Project BioShield.200 Unlike 
antibiotics, CBRN countermeasures can only be used in the event of a crisis 
and only have one true purchaser: the government.201 New antibiotics are 
not limited to use only in the event of a crisis.202 Rather, antibiotics have 
broader appeal and are more regularly used by the general public.203 
 
 195. GOTTRON, supra note 174, at 5 (discussing how funds have been transferred out of 
Project BioShield, creating an unstable funding source for prospective users of the program). 
 196. Id. (stating that funds have been rescinded and transferred out of Project BioShield, 
creating an unstable fund instead of the dedicated 5 billion dollar fund that was originally 
intended).  
 197. Id.   
 198. Herper, supra note 186 (stating that the cost of developing new drugs are extraordinarily 
high, and as a result, instability in funding sources creates additional risks that may serve as an 
additional disincentive to development of new antibiotics). 
 199. See, e.g., Sternberg, supra note 189 (discussing how the U.S. has stockpiled over 300 
million doses of smallpox vaccine as part of the SNS, and demonstrating how the SNS and the 
market guarantee can lead to large orders for products by the government, which serves as a 
substantial incentive for development). 
 200. See, e.g., Sten Stovall, EU Joins Widening Push to Find New Antibiotics, WALL ST. 
JOURNAL (May 24, 2012, 8:41 AM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304707604577423683954355876 
(discussing how financial incentives and other government efforts can encourage drug companies 
to develop new antibiotics). 
 201. GOTTRON, supra note 174, at 11 (noting how the pharmaceutical market has failed to 
produce CBRN countermeasures and that the government provides a market guarantee for CBRN 
countermeasure development); see also, e.g., Sternberg, supra note 189 (providing an example of 
how the government is the true purchaser of CBRN countermeasures). 
 202. NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, supra note 91 (stating that antibiotics fight various bacterial 
infections). 
 203. Stovall, supra note 200 (discussing the importance of antibiotics to the practice of 
medicine and their widespread use and appeal). 
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Antibiotics do not have the problem of only having the government as its 
sole purchaser.204 Instead, antibiotics are an important prophylactic that the 
government wants to purchase, and are also medicines that the general 
public will use outside of a crisis situation.205 As a result, the development 
of new antibiotics under Project BioShield is far more likely to occur than 
CBRN countermeasures.206  
 
D.      Priority Development of New Antibiotics Through the Use of the 
Defense Production Act 
 
Another legal tool in the President’s arsenal to fight superbugs is to 
exercise his authority pursuant to the Defense Production Act of 1950 
(“DPA”),207 where the President can order the priority performance of 
contracts with drug companies in order to develop new antibiotic 
therapies.208 The DPA grants the President legal authority to issue such an 
order when he deems it necessary for the national defense. 209 Congress 
stated in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act210 that “national defense,” as used in the DPA,211 includes “emergency 
preparedness activities.”212 The statutory authorization to include 
emergency preparedness activities in the DPA allows the President to order 
the prioritization of the development of any new antibiotics developed 
under Project BioShield.213 The increasing numbers and lethality of 
antibiotic resistant infections combined with a lack of development in the 
current marketplace of new antibiotics creates a major public health 
threat214 that amounts to a threat to national defense.215 
 
 204. Id.  
 205. Id.  
 206. GOTTRON, supra note 174, at 7 (noting that several contracts have been cancelled, but that 
these contracts were not for countermeasures with the wide market base as antibiotics). 
 207. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2061 (1950). 
 208. Id. § 2071 (2009). 
 209. § 2071(a). 
 210. 42 U.S.C. § 5195a (2012).   
 211. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2152(14) (2012). 
 212. 15 C.F.R. § 700.1 (2014). 
 213. § 2071 (authorizing the prioritization of any contract to promote the national defense, 
which is defined to include “emergency preparedness activities”); see also § 5195a(b) (including, 
as part of the emergency preparedness activities, actions that are designed to minimize the effect 
of a hazard on the civilian population).   
 214. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 5 (stating that antibiotic 
resistance is a threat because of the increasing lethality and ubiquity of antibiotic resistant 
infections). 
 215. Combating Antibiotic Resistance, Executive Order 13676, 79 Fed. Reg. 56,931 (Sept. 23, 
2014) (stating that combating antibiotic resistance is a national security priority). 
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A major outbreak of an antibiotic resistant infection is a potential 
calamitous event that public health and national security officials cannot 
ignore. Each year, antibiotic resistant infections cause twenty-three 
thousand Americans to die, and cause two million to become sick.216 A 
major and sudden outbreak of an antibiotic resistant infection would lead to 
catastrophic results.217 Since antibiotic resistant infections are viewed as a 
potential public health threat,218 the nation must prepare for the potential of 
such an emergency situation.219 Therefore, the President should be able to 
classify the threat caused by antibiotic resistant infections as necessary for 
emergency preparedness,220 and should thereby order government 
contractors to prioritize the development of new antibiotics to combat the 
threat.221  
 
E.     Quarantine Authority and Executive Order No. 13295 
 
A final tool that the President could use to control the spread of 
antibiotic resistant infections is to utilize the federal government’s authority 
to isolate and quarantine individuals. Executive Order No. 13295 is the 
authority upon which the federal government bases its ability to quarantine 
individuals.222 The federal government has limited quarantine authority and 
does not have the broad police powers of state governments.223 In 
Executive Order No. 13295, the federal government has the authority to 
quarantine individuals with cholera, diphtheria, infectious tuberculosis, 
plague, smallpox, yellow fever, severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(“SARS”), and viral hemorrhagic fevers.224 Of the 17 listed antibiotic 
resistant infections in the CDC’s report, the federal government only has 
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(Aug. 6, 2014). 
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(Aug. 6, 2014). 
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the authority to quarantine individuals with tuberculosis.225 In order to help 
promote the effectiveness of antibiotics, it is crucial to slow the spread of 
antibiotic resistant infections.226 In preventing the spread of antibiotic 
resistant infections, it may be necessary at some point to quarantine 
people.227 The federal government’s authority to quarantine individuals 
rests on the enumerated diseases in Executive Order No. 13295.228 
Currently, the federal government does not have the authority to detain 
individuals with antibiotic resistant infections because antibiotic resistant 
infections are not listed within the Executive Order.229 The growing 
prevalence and lethality of various resistant infections demonstrates that the 
17 listed infections in the CDC’s report should be placed within the 
Executive Order.230 The President can add diseases to the Executive Order 
pursuant to the recommendations of the Secretary of HHS and the Surgeon 
General.231 The Secretary of HHS and the Surgeon General could 
recommend to the President that antibiotic resistant infections be listed 
within the Executive Order. Taking such action does two things: (1) it 
provides clear authority to the federal government to quarantine infected 
individuals; and (2) provides a broader statement on the public health risk 
that such diseases pose.  
In combating deadly pathogens, it is important for the federal 
government to have every available tool at its disposal. The need for change 
in regards to antibiotic resistant infections became clear in 2007 with the 
Andrew Speaker incident.232 Andrew Speaker, a personal injury attorney 
from Atlanta, became infected with tuberculosis.233 The CDC believed that 
he was infected with extensively drug resistant tuberculosis (“XDR”), a 
deadly form of resistant tuberculosis.234 It turned out that Speaker was 
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infected with multi-drug resistant tuberculosis (“MDR”), which is less 
deadly, but it is still another virulent strain of tuberculosis.235 While health 
officials believed Speaker to be infected with XDR, they also chose to not 
exercise their quarantine authority.236 As a result, Speaker was able to 
board a plane and expose numerous people to MDR;237 fortunately no one 
became infected.238 This incident demonstrates the need for the federal 
government to have the clear authority to quarantine individuals with 
resistant infections. Quarantine is an important tool in the fight against 
resistant infections because it will help slow the spread of infections, and 
will increase the effectiveness of antibiotics already on the market.239  
 
III.      CONCLUSION 
 
The solutions to the problem of antibiotic resistant infections proposed 
in this Article are drastic and less than ideal. Congressional failure to 
address this problem,240 however, suggests the need for drastic executive 
action. Antibiotic resistant infections have become a problem of such 
magnitude that it arguably represents a threat to the nation’s security. In 
these circumstances, the President can employ existing legislation to rapidly 
combat and address this problem through several means:241 (1) through the 
scheduling process in the CSA, the government can better control the 
existing supply of antibiotics to promote antibiotic stewardship;242 (2) the 
President can exercise his authority through the incorporation of antibiotics 
into Project BioShield;243 (3) the President can use the DPA to encourage 
the development of new antibiotics;244 and (4) if necessary—and 
appropriate based on the circumstances—antibiotic resistant infections can 
be incorporated into Executive Order 13295 in order to grant the federal 
government authority to quarantine individuals with antibiotic resistant 
infections.245 Overall, the federal government has the authority to regulate 
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the current supply of antibiotics, develop new antibiotics, and halt the 
spread of antibiotic resistant infections through quarantine.246 Hopefully the 
President will not need to employ the legal options proposed in this Article. 
Absent action by Congress to specifically address the problem, however, 
the President should employ all legal solutions at his disposal to rectify this 
pressing and important problem. 
 
 
 246. See Combating Antibiotic Resistance, Executive Order 13676, 79 Fed. Reg. 56,931 (Sept. 
23, 2014) (ordering various executive agencies to use all of the authority at their disposal to 
combat antibiotic resistance). 
